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Recently, the Japanese government and entities have become more active in 
locating profitable CDM projects all over the world.  China has revised its 
skeptical attitude toward the CDM and has become more active.  This change 
has prompted Japanese entities to invest in several CDM projects in China. 
However, few CDM projects have been implemented at thermal power 
plants in China despite the large mitigation potential for local and transboundary 
environmental damage. This chapter explores how financial aspects discourage 
investment in such CDM projects.  The main findings are as follows: (a) 
Japanese entities exclusively pursue the cost-effective acquisition of certified 
emission reductions (CERs) through the CDM, and they take sustainable 
development impacts into consideration only as far as to get local people to 
accept the project; (b) CDM-specific risks, additionality and non-commercialized 
requirements, and China’s CDM rules raise perceived credit risks to lenders 
which makes it difficult for project developers to secure a financial package for 
large-scale, long-term CDM projects such as thermal power CDM projects; (c) 
China’s restrictive foreign direct investment (FDI) policy in the power sector, 
coupled with a less transparent approval process for project finance, forces 
foreign developers to finance by equity or private commercial loans with less 
favorable terms of conditions, which leads to investment in small-scale coal-fired 
thermal power plants that are banned under the recent SO2 emissions control 
policy in China; and (d) recent SO2 emissions control policy on flue-gas 
desulfurization (FGD) installation discourages energy-efficiency and fuel 
conversion at coal-fired power plants, which have large mitigation impacts on 
transboundary acid rain. 
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Previous research has found that the Kyoto mechanisms significantly lower the 
costs of achieving Kyoto Protocol commitments.  Among the Kyoto mechanisms, 
CDM is estimated to generate the largest emission reduction traded in the market: 
estimates range from a 55% to 77% share and between US$3,212 and US$21,208 in 
value (Janssen, 2003). 
As seen later in Chapter 5, a huge difference in marginal abatement cost of GHGs 
exists between China and Japan.  This implies that Japanese entities can potentially 
save on GHG reduction costs by implementing CDM projects in China.  In addition, 
China became less skeptical and more receptive as the structure of the mechanisms 
evolved, and its understanding of the mechanisms and their potential benefits to China 
became clear (Zhang, 2003).  It perceives the CDM as a means for attaining 
economic and diplomatic goals.  With technical assistance from aid donors, China 
has developed capacity to manage the CDM 1.  It officially published “Measures for 
Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China” in 
2005, and held international seminars to attract foreign investors and purchasers of 
certified emissions reductions (CERs).  This measure makes transparent the 
procedure for foreign firms to enter into CDM projects in China. 
These advances create latitude for designing CDM projects that can reduce not 
only GHG emissions but also acid deposition, thus reducing damage to local and 
regional environments and health.  In fact, several GHG reduction projects have 
accorded health benefits in China (Aunan et al., 2004; Wang and Smith, 1999).  This 
ancillary benefit will materialize as long as both the Chinese government and 
Japanese entities have a strong incentive to choose CDM projects in the project 
selection and approval process. 
In reality, however, both the Chinese government and Japanese entities have taken 
little, if any, notice of the impacts on transboundary air pollution and acid rain 
problems when deciding the type and location of CDM projects.  Up to November 
2008, the CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB) had approved 53 CDM projects that 
Japanese entities have committed to in China.  Small hydropower has the highest 
number (22 projects), followed by wind power (10), and waste gas/heat utilization (7) 
(Table 4-1).  By contrast, there are only 3 projects that target coal-fired thermal 
power plants: 2 for waste gas/heat utilization and 1 fuel switching project, which are 
implemented in Shangxi, Inner-Mongolia and Anfui provinces.  Other waste gas/heat 
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utilization projects are implemented at iron and steel, and chemical plants, but are 
located in Chongqing, Shaanxi and Hunan provinces and have little impact on 
region-wide acid rain. The amount of CERs increased rapidly in 2005 because several 
HFC-23 reduction projects were approved (Figure 4-1). 
Another 111 CDM projects that Japanese entities have committed to in China, and 
which the Chinese government has approved, are waiting for the approval of the 
CDM-EB.  Only 4 among them, however, are projects to be implemented at thermal 
power plants: 3 for fuel switching and 1 for waste gas/heat utilization.  Other waste 
gas/heat utilization projects are implemented at iron and steel and cement plants, but 
they are mostly located in coastal areas in Shanxi, Shandong, Jinagsu, Hebei, and 
Zhengjiang provinces. 
Why have Japanese entities committed to, and the Chinese government approved, 
so few CDM projects that will reduce transboundary air pollution and acid rain 
problems? This chapter explores the institutional and economic factors involved. 
4-2 Incentives for Japanese entities 
Japanese entities have had little incentive to implement CDM projects for three 
main reasons: (1) perceived higher risk and lower returns, (2) no legally binding 
targets for GHG emissions reductions to Japanese entities, and (3) China’s rejection of 
the idea of Joint Implementation (JI) and skepticism about Activities Jointly 
Implemented (AIJ). 
Since 2005, these reasons have been mitigated or eliminated.  Firstly, the Kyoto 
Protocol came into effect in February 2005, and Japan could no longer make excuses 
for non-compliance.  Assuming that GHG emissions from the transport and 
household sectors continue to increase, the Japanese government and Japanese entities 
will be hard pressed to reach their own GHG reduction targets, even though the targets 
are not legally binding. In addition, the risk that CERs the investors obtained would be 
of little value after 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol is terminated.  Secondly, despite 
NGO criticisms of high profitability without substantial contribution to sustainable 
development in host countries, the CDM-EB approved HFC-23 reduction and N2O 
decomposition projects.  This allows project developers to easily find CDM projects 
with a high rate of return.  Thirdly, the international emission trading market has 
developed well, and CER prices have increased in response to the rising international 
crude oil price.  This offers firms an opportunity to earn profits by selling CERs 
gained through CDM projects on the international market.  Fourthly, China has 
become active in CDM projects, especially after unilateral CDM was approved at the 
Conference of Parties (COP). 
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These changes have persuaded Japanese entities to commit to CDM projects, but 
only in so far as they are a cheaper way to attain targets.  Therefore, they pursue 
CDM projects that offer a higher rate of return with lower risk. 
4-3 Barriers inherent to the CDM institution 
CDM projects entail initial costs for developers, and even low-cost activities may 
not be paid back within a year.  This is because CERs from JI and CDM projects, 
which adopt the baseline-and-credit or post-verification emission trading systems, 
may only be issued after emissions reductions have actually occurred and have been 
verified and certified (Janssen, 2000).  Due to this time lag between cash outflow and 
cash inflow, it is necessary to finance GHG emission reduction activities from sources 
other than receipts from those activities.  Projects with investments in latest 
technologies (that satisfy technological additionality) often generate less cash inflow 
than outflow for several years, thus requiring long-term financing. 
To finance CDM projects from sources other than retained earnings, the financial 
structure should be arranged in such a way that downward risk is minimized.  
According to the UNEP Risoe Center on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development (2004), the major risks that CDM projects present for stakeholders can 
be categorized as follows. 
(1) Special risks due to the fact that a revenue stream from a CDM project relies 
upon a new and developing international legal framework  
(2) Risks due to the fact that the project is incorporated in a developing country 
with certain political and regulatory uncertainties 
(3) General project risks, which are common to all projects in developing and 
industrialized countries 
4-3-1 CDM-specific risks 
CDM-specific risks include the following. 
(a) Kyoto Protocol regulatory risks, such as the risk that the Kyoto Protocol does 
not enter into force, or that a CDM project may be rejected by the CDM-EB 
on the basis that the project baseline does not comply with the Kyoto 
Protocol rules 
(b) Risks derived from inaccurate carbon accounting that will result in the 
generation of less CERs than expected 
(c) Uncertainty of CER market price that makes contracts entered into, to sell or 
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purchase, no longer economically beneficial 
(d) Community or NGO opposition risk, based on differing perspectives of the 
fluid concepts of “additionality” and “sustainable development” 
(e) Legal title risk, that parties may not be able to establish legal title to the 
emission reduction on which CERs are based 
To mitigate these risks, the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) and the 
Government of the Netherlands fund entitled Certified Emission Reduction Unit 
Procurement Tender (CERUPT) offer a kind of grant to CDM project developers, such 
as a fixed unit price for a minimum amount of emission reduction that is stable for the 
life of the emission reduction purchase agreement (ERPA), and advance payment and 
purchase of a certain amount of additional emission reductions earned by a project. 
These risk mitigation measures are not offered without costs.  Both the PCF and 
CERUPT assign severe penalties if project developers fail to deliver CERs for any 
reason other than force majeure.  Such stringent penalties prevent project developers 
from breaching the ERPA when the market price for CERs becomes much higher than 
the price under the existing contract.  Thus, project developers cannot escape from 
uncertainty over the quantity of CERs and regulatory risks. 
In China, three projects were developed or were in preparation under the PCF and 
CERUPT by May 2004.  The Inner Mongolia Huitengxile Wind Farm Development 
Project was awarded a CDM project contract by the Netherlands.  The Coal-bed 
Methane Project and the Xiaogushan Run-of-river Hydropower Project were in 
preparation with investment from the PCF (Zhang, 2004).  Among them, the later 
project was partly financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Table 4-2).  
The ADB provided US$35 million of concessional loans for the purpose of rural 
electrification through clean energy 2.  Although the ADB did not intend to finance 
the CDM project at the outset, it helped to secure a financial package for it.  In other 
words, the project may not have obtained sufficient financial resources without the 
ADB’s assistance. 
The Japanese government also set up several measures for helping Japanese 
project developers to prepare and implement CDM projects.  The Japanese 
government provides two risk mitigation measures as indicated above: a fixed unit 
price under ERPA, and advance payment for feasibility studies and validation.  
Instead of purchase assurance of additional emission reductions, the Japan Carbon 
Fund (JCF) provides technical support in preparing project design documents (PDDs) 
and upfront payment of CERs, even before project developers finish validation 
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registration.  In addition, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) offers 
export credit, and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) provides export 
insurance.  The motives behind these actions are the increasing demands for CERs on 
the part of the Japanese government and firms who want to purchase CERs at cheaper 
prices.  Because all but the JCF are government institutions, and the JCF was 
sponsored by government financial institutions and major Japanese entities, the Japan 
Kyoto Mechanisms Acceleration Program, which is composed of all of these 
institutions, has a mission to purchase as many CERs, and as cheaply, as possible. 
In sum, carbon investment funds have the potential to diversify away some risks, 
such as CER price risk, associated with investments in activities that aim to result in 
marketable emission permits.  However, they cannot cover the risk of actual quantity 
of emissions reductions or regulatory risks.  This remains a barrier to the financing 
of CDM projects by private financial institutions.  Financial support from 
international development institutions such as the ADB, export credit agencies, and 
export insurance agencies will also mitigate risks and financial constraints on CDM 
projects, and improve the chances for project developers to secure financing.  
However, project developers do not always obtain finance from such large institutions. 
4-3-2 Additionality and non-commercialized requirements 
Additionality requirements of the CDM forces projects to take place in situations 
where there are legal and regulatory restrictions and low internal rates of return, or 
where the technology adopted is not yet commercialized or has not been applied in the 
region.  Thermal power is one of the hardest subsectors to prove additionality and 
commercial unviability, both of which are basic requirement to be approved at the 
CDM Executive Board.  As in the OECD’s Helsinki package that harmonizes terms 
of conditions of export credit, thermal power is regarded as commercially viable, and 
tied aid is therefore banned, even for FGD installation, while renewable and 
hydropower plants are regarded as commercially unviable (Shiroyama, 2007).  Partly 
reflecting this decision, and alongside an international anti-coal movement, it was not 
until 2007 that the CDM Executive Board approved a methodology for energy 
efficiency. 
This requirement, together with new and complex procedures, increases the risk 
profile for undertaking CDM projects in comparison to other types of projects.  This 
makes it difficult to obtain sufficient financial resources from investors and financial 
institutions.  It may also deter investment in CDM projects that require a large 
amount of investment and long payoff period, including construction and operation of 
infrastructure projects related to energy, transportation, or urban utilities sectors.  
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Such projects incur huge initial investment costs while returns depend on profitability 
over the long run.  As project size increases, and as host country governments 
endeavor to develop many projects at one time, project developers cannot secure 
financing solely by means of retained earnings and/or corporate finance.  
Accordingly, they finance it through equity and a significant share of debt.  On 
average, debt accounts for 60-70% of financing (Bellier and Zhou, 2002).  However, 
most projects have suffered from insufficient financing because domestic financial 
systems are not well developed and are not credible enough to provide long-term 
project-based loans.  This experience implies that project developers of 
infrastructure CDM projects are likely to face the same, or more, difficulties in 
securing a financial package, as not much progress has been seen in the availability 
and credibility of long-term financing.  In addition, financial institutions will not 
receive CERs generated from the CDM; their sources of profits come solely from loan 
repayment. 
Insufficient availability of long-term debt financing has driven project developers 
into projects that can recover costs within a short period of time, such as HFC-23 
reduction and N2O decomposition.  These types of projects have an advantage in 
fund raising in that they employ proven technologies, emission reductions are easy to 
verify, and they attract huge amounts of CERs, and thus are expected to generate 
substantial profits with low risks.  Financial institutions do not perceive these 
projects as high risk and are prepared to provide long-term corporate finance to 
project developers.  By contrast, financial institutions are unwilling to provide 
long-term finance on the same favorable terms of conditions to developers of CDM 
projects where profits can only be expected after a long generation period and/or 
while utilizing latest technologies, unless governments are willing to offer measures 
that mitigate the risks and/or provide preferential treatment specific to these types of 
CDM projects. 
4-4 Barriers accrue to policies in China 
4-4-1 CDM policy 
The Chinese government stipulated “Measures for Operation and Management of 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China” so that it can retain effective 
control over CDM projects.  Thus, it has many provisions that are unfavorable to 
foreign entities.  It requires that a project developer shall be a wholly China-owned 
or China-controlled enterprise, and that a foreign entity join a CDM project as a minor 
 Ch4-8 
partner of the project developer and should transfer environmentally sound technology, 
bring up-front investment to overcome credit constraints in China, and purchase CERs 
to secure returns from the investment. 
This measure also has a sectoral bias.  It imposes a special levy of 65% of the 
CER transfer benefit from CDM projects involving emissions reductions of HFC-23, 
SF6 and perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 30% from those of N2O decomposition.  On 
the other hand, a 2% levy is applied to projects in four priority areas—energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, methane capture and energy utilization, and coal-bed 
methane—as well as forestry and small-scale projects. 
Nonetheless, China accepted eighteen N2O decomposition projects and 10 HFC-23 
reduction projects and will generate 4.4 million tons of CERs by 2012 (Table 4-3).  
Japanese entities committed to two N2O decomposition projects and eight HFC-23 
reduction projects.  This implies higher levies cannot completely offset the rate of 
return on these projects and has not discouraged foreign investors. 
Among the priority areas, a large number of CDM projects are implemented 
except in energy efficiency.  The CDM-EB has approved a hundred twenty-eight 
small hydropower, eighty-seven renewable energy, thirty-three waste gas and heat 
recovery, and twenty four methane recovery, while only nine fuel conversion projects.  
Considering that the Chinese government regards small hydropower as renewable 
energy, this measure resulted in directing CDM projects toward renewable energy 3. 
It should be noted, however, that the Chinese government is cautious about 
large-scale CDM projects that connect to the main transmission lines to sell generated 
power to the grid, including wind power.  The Trial Measures for Renewable Energy 
Power Generation Pricing and Cost Sharing of 2006 stipulate that the 
power-purchasing price of wind power is to be determined by competitive bidding, 
while that of biomass and solar power is set by the government.  This implies that the 
government guarantees a certain rate of return to biomass and solar power generators, 
while the internal rate of return of wind power generation is shrinking.  Recent 
bidding results show the power purchasing price of wind power has dropped from 
RMB 0.7-0.8/ kWh to 0.563 kWh on average, which turned profit from wind power 
generators negative (Wang, 2006).  This will discourage project developers from 
investing in wind power generation.  In addition, it is quite uncertain whether local 
electric power companies will allow non-local power generators to connect to the 
local grid at the price that the central government determines. From this it can be 
inferred why most renewable energy CDM projects that have been registered are 
concentrated on wind power and small hydropower, which do not have to sell their 
power to the grid, or methane capture at solid waste landfill sites and coal mining, 
which do not require transforming into electric power. 
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In sum, China’s CDM policy has directed investment towards the types of CDM 
projects that can gain large amount of CERs with low commercial risks (N2O 
decomposition, HFC-23 reduction and coal-bed methane), that employ conventional 
or proven technology to develop energy supply capacity (small hydropower and 
cement), and that reduce energy poverty and accelerate coal substitution and reduction 
(wind power). 
4-4-2 Policy on foreign participation in the power sector 
In China, most power plant investment was traditionally financed by the 
government, state-owned banks, and by the power plants themselves.  Under the 
planned economy (before 1978), financing for the development of the power industry 
came mostly from allocation of government funds.  The share of central government 
expenditure was the largest (55%), followed by state-owned banks (25%) and 
self-finance (10%) (Murray, Reinhardt, and Vietor, 1998).  There were no conditions 
for repayment of capital or interest, but the Ministry of Electric Power collected all 
profits from the power plants.  Because depreciation for accounting purposes was 
ignored and electricity prices remained low, the Ministry of Electric Power recovered 
only a part of the operational costs. 
During the period of transformation (1979-1997), financing sources were 
diversified so that the capacity of power generation capacity was rapidly increased.  
The share of central government expenditure dropped and that of self-finance rose in 
the 1980s (Murray, Reinhardt and Vietor, 1998).  The share of state-owned banks 
increased because the government replaced grants with loans for financing electric 
power projects, and implemented a policy that sought external funds for power plant 
development (Figure 4-2).  This implies that the power industry took advantage of 
bank loans to develop generation capacity.  However, their share did not increase 
much because the Ministry of Electric Power intervened in the allocation of capital, 
and no policy existed for repayment of loans provided by banks and investors (Yao, Li 
and Jiang, 2003) 4. 
In order to reduce chronic electricity shortages, enhance productivity of Chinese 
power plants, and supplement the required financial resources, the Chinese 
government decided to open up power generation to foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the early 1990s.  It has succeeded in developing 77 projects worth US$27 billion in 
the power sector during 1990-2000 (Bellier and Zhou, 2002).  The projects are 
concentrated mostly in Guandong, Jiangsu and Anhui, but some are implemented in 
regions other than the Northeast and Southwest. 
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Most of China’s power projects involving private participation have been carried 
out through joint ventures between foreign investors and power companies owned by 
local governments.  Recently, some of the largest projects have been implemented 
using the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, with the project company being either 
a joint venture or wholly foreign-owned enterprise. 
There are two reasons foreign investors have preferred joint ventures over other 
types of investment.  First, joint ventures enable the Chinese government to retain 
significant control over projects. Due to fears of foreign exchange outflow and 
inflation, by 1995 the Chinese government had not approved any foreign direct 
investments in the power sector where the foreign share exceeded 50%.  Second, 
foreign investors could expect their Chinese partners to help build consensus on 
projects among local and state organizations, reducing legal and regulatory risks.  
The local partner was often seen as a safeguard against unfavorable price reviews, 
dispatch risk, or both.  Foreign investors generally facilitated intangible but critical 
political alliances as well as more secure access to scarce inputs like fuel, foreign 
exchange and expertise.  Foreign firms undertaking cooperative joint ventures 
usually did so with local power bureaus or other local governmental authorities.  It 
enabled them to obtain favorable contract terms but to limit legal recourse in cases of 
contract breach such as purchase contracts and fuel supply contracts with Chinese 
counterparts (Blackman and Wu, 1999). 
Foreign lenders, on the other hand, perceived excessive credit risk among their 
Chinese counterparts, many of them being quasi-government entities or recent 
corporate spin-offs of government entities, of which there was almost no information 
regarding financial viability.  As a substitute, support letters were sought from 
governments to ensure that the counterparts would meet their contract obligations.  
These support letters were not legally enforceable and became of little value when the 
International Trust and Investment Corporations (ITICs) went bankrupt.  At that time, 
the government refused bail out requests from international lenders.  With a lack of 
creditworthy counterparts, foreign lenders will impose more stringent requirements 
for security on a project, including securities on project assets and contract rights.  
However, creating and enforcing such securities is not easy for lenders (Bellier and 
Zhou, 2002). 
Furthermore, foreign lenders have no way to counter their perceived higher credit 
risks.  The government has no well-defined policy towards foreign investments.  
The complicated approval process is not transparent; investors have to negotiate with 
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various levels and sectors of the government which takes a long time and increases 
project risks.  The State Planning Commission stopped approving projects with rates 
of return in excess of 12% in 1993, and later 15%, so that foreign investors would not 
make what the government saw as unwarranted gains from China’s need for energy 
(Murray, Reinhardt and Vietor, 1998).  Foreign lenders, especially those that 
provided loans for project finance, considered the profit caps to be inconsistent with 
their perceived higher risks, and lost interest in the projects.  Instead they had 
incentive to invest in small-scale projects that did not need government approval, 
most of which were less energy efficient (Blackman and Wu, 1999). 
As a result, even joint ventures had to finance power projects through equity or 
less favorable private commercial loans.  Recently, a growing number of investors 
have applied the BOT model to project finance.  However, most of them have relied 
heavily either on international public debt financing or on export credits from the 
investors’ countries.  The number of projects that have obtained export credits is 
quite limited since export credit is accessible only by large-size well-established 
foreign firms in industrialized countries. 
The Chinese government modified the regulations relating to the foreign financing 
of infrastructure development in the latter half of the 1990s.  The Project Financing 
Measures issued in 1997 aimed at standardizing the approach to international project 
financing.  However, the approval process was still not transparent, reflecting 
government concerns about important issues typically involved in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, such as large capital investments, foreign exchange obligations, 
potential impact on domestic inflation, and possible exposure of state entities to risks 
through foreign debt guarantees.  Although several municipalities published bylaws 
regarding the framework, way of participation, selection process and cost burden rules 
for foreign investors in infrastructure projects in an attempt to attract foreign 
investment in urban infrastructure projects, still the number of BOT type large thermal 
power generation projects decreased in the 2000s. 
An exception is renewable energy.  To combat serious power shortages, improve 
energy infrastructure, diversify energy supplies, safeguard energy security, and protect 
the environment, the government enacted “The Renewable Energy Law of People’s 
Republic of China” in 2006.  This act requires the energy authorities of State Councils 
to set mid- and long-term targets for the development and utilization, and total volume 
of renewable energy at the national level, and to make their opinions public before 
approval by the State Council.  It also describes several measures by the government to 
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support and encourage renewable energy, including development guidance catalogs, 
publication of technical standards, announcement of conditions for entry into 
grid-connected power network, gas and heat pipeline networks, establishment of a 
renewable energy development fund to provide financial support for scientific and 
technological research, and renewable energy use projects in rural and remote areas.  
Financial institutions may offer preferential loans for renewable energy development 
and utilization projects that are listed in the national renewable energy industrial 
development guidance catalog and conform to the conditions for granting loans. 
In response, the State Development and Reform Committee (SDRC) made a draft 
“Mid- and Long-term Renewable Energy Development Plan” in 2005, and set a target 
share for renewable energy of 30% by 2020, up from 7% in 2004.  To achieve this 
target, the government will invest RMB 1.5 trillion in development and utilization of 
renewable energy over the next 15 years.  In addition, it will invest RMB 1 billion 
every year to replace the use of crude oil with methane gas in rural areas, expanding 
methane gas use to 24 cubic meters by 2020, from 5 cubic meters in 2004 5. 
This plan served to accelerate plant construction for renewable energy that had 
already started, as well as scientific and technological research.  Foreign and domestic 
firms actively invested in wind power generation from 2004, when China faced serious 
power shortages.  To meet the goals described in the Tenth Five-year Development 
Plan (2002-2007), various scientific and technological research projects have been 
instigated and several biomass power plant projects launched. 
Thus, strict government control of foreign participation in thermal power 
generation makes foreign lenders perceive a high credit risk among their Chinese 
counterparts while expecting a lower rate of return, which inhibits project developers 
in obtaining long-term, project-based commercial loans.  As a result, project 
developers have to finance most of the investment from equity, export credit from the 
investor’s own government, and short-term loans at unfavorable terms of conditions.  
This financial structure results in a higher weighted average cost of capital that will 
ultimately lead to higher tariffs. 
4-4-3 SO2 control policy 
Assuming that the power sector would become the largest source of SO2 emissions 
(Figure 1-3), the Chinese government adopted a new SO2 emission regulation for 
thermal power plants in 2003.  It required that (a) construction and expansion of 
coal-fired thermal power plants basically be banned in construction areas of large and 
medium scale cities, (b) fuel-gas desulphurization (FGD) equipment be installed when 
construction or expansion of coal-fired thermal power plants located in the SO2 and 
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acid rain control areas occurs, and (c) coal use be prohibited for small boilers in the 
two control zones and the use of high sulfur coal be banned in all areas.  To enforce 
power plant compliance with this regulation, the central government, through the 
China Development Bank, increased subsidized loans to support construction of 
FGD-equipped large-size coal-fired power plants.  This mandate, together with 
market-based FGD diffusion strategies in Germany and Austria, enabled Chinese 
manufacturers to mass produce cheaper but lower efficiency FGD systems, which was 
acceptable because the efficacy of installed FGD systems to remove SO2 emissions 
was not stipulated (Horii, 2006).  In this sense, this regulation is regarded as the most 
effective driving force for SO2 emissions reductions in China. 
However, this regulation discourages foreign participation in CDM projects at 
thermal power plants.  Firstly, it places more severe financial constraints on foreign 
project developers.  As examined in the previous section, China’s restrictive FDI 
policy in the power sector, coupled with a less than transparent approval process for 
project finance, forces foreign developers to finance via equity or private commercial 
loans with less favorable terms of conditions.  These financing constraints induce 
developers to invest in small-scale coal-fired thermal power plants, but since the new 
SO2 regulation banned construction of this type of plant, less and less room remains 
for foreign developers to take part in thermal power plant projects. 
Secondly, it in effect discriminates against thermal power plant projects that 
switch to low sulfur fuel, raise energy efficiency and recover and use waste gas and 
heat, which can reduce SO2 and GHG emissions at the same time, and have local and 
regional ancillary benefits.  These projects offer the Chinese government a 
cost-effective way of mitigating both air pollution and climate change.  Nevertheless, 
the Chinese government has yet to take actions to correct the bias. 
4-5 Conclusion 
This chapter clarifies why thermal power CDM projects have been so few while 
N2O decomposition and renewable energy projects are increasing in China.  The 
main findings are as follows. 
(a) Japanese entities exclusively pursue the cost-effective acquisition of CERs 
through the CDM.  They take sustainable development impacts into 
consideration only as a means to get local people to accept a project. 
(b) CDM specific risks, additionality and non-commercialized requirements, and 
China’s CDM rules increase perceived credit risks to lenders making it 
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difficult for project developers to secure a financial package for large-scale, 
long-term CDM projects such as thermal power CDM projects.  Risk 
mitigation measures, such as advance payment and upfront payment through 
ERPA, have encouraged project developers to enter into CDM projects, but 
they cannot replace insufficient long-term loans. 
(c) China’s restrictive FDI policy in the power sector, coupled with a less than 
transparent approval process for project finance, forces foreign developers to 
finance by equity or private commercial loans with less favorable terms of 
conditions.  This financing condition leads to investment in small-scale 
coal-fired thermal power plants, but these types of plants are banned under 
China’s recent SO2 emissions control policy.  This narrows the opportunity 
for foreign developers to implement CDM projects at thermal power plants. 
(d) Recent SO2 emissions control policy on FGD installation discourages 
energy-efficiency and fuel conversion at coal-fired power plants, which can 
have large mitigation impacts on transboundary acid rain. 
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1 Four large assistance projects focusing on capacity building for CDM projects were 
carried out during 2002-2004.  World Bank et al., (2004) is one of the outputs of 
this technical assistance. 
2 The terms of condition of the ADB’s loan is at floating rate of 2.15% (in accordance 
with ADB's LIBOR-based loan facility) plus other fees, with a 24 year lending 
period and a 20 year of repayment period. 
3 The SDRC defines “small” hydropower as having less than 50,000 kW generation 
capacity, as well as wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and tidal power as 
“renewable” energy.  Behind this inclusion lies the Chinese government’s 
expectation that small hydropower will be a prominent instrument for rural areas to 
utilize their own energy resources for development, thus solving serious problems 
in rural areas: agricultural development, rural economic development and income 
increase, and burden reduction for farmers.  Small hydropower, so far, has 
provided electricity for 300 million people, especially to those who live in remote 
areas and rural minorities (Japan Electric Power Information Center, 2006). 
4 State-owned commercial banks were reorganized as one central bank (People’s 
Bank of China) and four state-owned commercial banks: the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, People’s Construction Bank of China, 
and Agricultural Bank of China.  Even reorganized into commercial banks, the 
four state-owned banks have provided significant funding to government-led 
projects, and participated in only a few private projects (Lardy, 1998; Chen and 
Shih, 2004).  They debited state-owned enterprises over 80% of all the outstanding 
loans (He, 2002). 
5 Economic Times China, November 8, 2005. 
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Figure 4-1 Cumulative number and amount of CER of CDM projects in Japan  
 Source of data: IGES (2008). 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Share of Major Financing Source for Fixed Asset Investment in the 
Electric Power Industry in the Transformation Period 
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Table 4-1 Number of projects and amount of CER of Japanese entities 
invested in CDM projects in China registered to UNFCCC (as of November 
2008) 
Note 1: Includes joint CDM project with the UK. 
Note 2: Includes joint CDM project with Sweden. 
Source of data: IGES (2008). 
 
 
Table 4-2 Financing structure of China's Xiaogushan Run-of-river Hydropower 
Project 
Financing Sources US$ million 
 Equity 14.0  
    Gansu Heihe Hydropower Development Shareholder Company Ltd. 7.0  
    Zhangye Water and Power Bureau 4.2  
    Gansu Silver Dragon Construction Company Ltd. (private) 2.8  
 Asian Development Bank Loan 35.0  
 Local Commercial Long-term Loans 36.8  
 Bank of China Short-term Loan 1.2  
     Total 87.0  
Project revenues   
 Sale of CO2 emission reductions (ERs) to the PCF 11.1  
Note 1: ERPA value at US$3 per CO2 equivalent tons for 10 years even though it is estimated 
to rise to US$6 per CO2 equivalent tons. 
Note 2: Terms of conditions of local commercial bank's loan is 5.76%, with a repayment 
period of 15 years. 
Source: Prototype Carbon Fund, 2003; ADB, 2003. 
Number of project Amount of CER ％
HFC reduction (1) 2 90,348,135 74.7
N2O decomposition 2 6,282,962 5.2
Biogas 1 570,715 0.5
Biomass 0 0 0.0
Methane recovery 1 580,617 0.5
Methane avoidance 0 0 0.0
Afforestation 0 0 0.0
Hydropower 19 10,064,364 8.3
Fuel conversion 1 2,642,079 2.2
Waste gas and heat 7 6,316,116 5.2
Wind power (2) 7 4,214,531 3.5
Total 40 121,019,520 100.0
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 Table 4-3 Number and Amount of CER in CDM Projects in China (as of 
November 2008) 
Source of Data: IGES (2008). 
 
Number of project Amount of CER ％
HFC reduction 10 345,166,475 50.0
N2O decomposition 18 94,968,670 13.8
Biogas 1 570,715 0.1
Biomass 11 8,656,464 1.3
Methane recovery 24 49,097,391 7.1
Methane avoidance 1 204,795 0.0
Afforestation 1 340,223 0.0
Hydropower 128 56,889,939 8.2
Fuel conversion 9 37,162,963 5.4
Waste gas and heat 33 45,689,230 6.6
Wind power 75 51,856,076 7.5
Total 311 690,602,942 100.0
